We acknowledge the superb research assistance of Martin Kanz. We are also greatly indebted to Luis Bértola, Michael Clemens, John Coatsworth, and Yael Hadass for their help in constructing the underlying data base for other projects with Williamson. We are also grateful to them and to Brad Delong, Chang- Tai Additionally, both effects were asymmetric between Core and Periphery, findings that speak directly to the terms of trade debates that have raged since Prebisch and Singer wrote more than 50 years ago. The paper also investigates one channel of impact, and finds that foreign capital inflows declined steeply where commodity prices were volatile.
Introduction
This essay explores an underappreciated aspect of long term growth: most countries outside Western Europe and the US have been specialized in the export of just a handful of commodities for most of their history; some of these commodities have proven more volatile than others; and those with more volatile primary product prices have grown slowly relative both to the industrial leaders and to other primary product exporters. Looking at nearly a century of price change, we draw a direct link between commodity price volatility and economic underdevelopment. Our findings are reminiscent of what Carlos Diaz-Alejandro (1984) called the "commodity lottery". Each country's exportable resources, he explained, were determined in large part by geography and chance, and differences in later economic development were a consequence of the economic, political and institutional attributes of each commodity. We argue that the exogenous price volatility of each primary product mattered most by generating internal instability, reduced investment, and diminished economic growth. 1 Volatility is measured as the standard deviation of departures from a slowmoving trend. 2 The figure clearly depicts a negative correlation between terms of trade volatility and subsequent level of development, not just in the total sample but also within the subset of primary product-specialized countries traditionally known as the Periphery. We argue that the causation is much more likely to run from the terms of trade to growth rather than the other way around. Our terms of trade data are based on world market prices, and the primary producers in our sample are for the most part price-takers on the world market. Thus, secular changes and volatility in the terms of trade were exogenous events in the Periphery. This terms of trade evidence can shed light on three longstanding economic growth puzzles. First, although specialization in the production and export of primary products has proven to be one of the most enduring and robust determinants of poor economic growth, 3 economists have yet to account fully for the power of commodity-specialization in predicting economic performance. Second, economic performance among the resource-rich has varied enormously. In the last 150 years, some have grown remarkably fast (e.g.
Canada and Norway), some have grown very slowly (e.g. Colombia and, until recently, India), while many lie somewhere in between (e.g. Turkey and Brazil). Clearly, primary product exporters were not created equal. Third, while such differences in long term economic performance are usually explained by the contending fundamental determinants of growth-namely institutions, geography and culture, these fundamentals exhibit far more persistence over time than do the growth rates they are supposed to explain. 4 We suspect that an important determinant of growth has been overlooked in the contest between constitutions, cultures and coastlines. Observers regularly point to terms of trade shocks as a key source of macroeconomic instability in commodity-specialized countries, but they pay far less attention to the growth implications. 5 In this essay, we exploit the long-term historical evidence to explore the hypothesis that exogenous shocks in the terms of trade can account for both the variance around fundamentals and the fundamentals themselves. Using a new database of global terms of trade for 35 countries over eight decades-a coverage of more than 85 percent of the world population and nearly all of world GDP in 1914-we conclude that terms of trade volatility can explain the instability of growth rates, but more importantly that differences in price volatility can also help explain differences in long-term growth. Looking at the Periphery alone (the European Offshoots, Latin America, Asia and the Middle East), simple OLS estimates strongly suggest that between 1870 and 1939 a one standard deviation increase in terms of trade volatility was associated with a decrease in the rate of growth 2 This trend was calculated using a Hodrick-Prescott filter as discussed in Section 2. 3 For example, Sala-i-Martin (1997) or Sachs and Warner (2001) . 4 See Easterly, Kremer, Pritchett, and Summers (1993) . 5 For important exceptions, see Mendoza (1997) , Deaton and Miller (1996) , Kose and Reizman (2001) , Bleaney and Greenway (2001) , and Hadass and Williamson (2003) .
of GDP per capita of from 0.50 to 0.75 percent per annum, a decline robust to changes in the time period, volatility measure, and nations on the margin assigned to the Periphery category.
We also investigate one prime channel through which volatility could have impacted growthinvestment. Eichengreen (1996: 39, 72) has argued that countries in the Periphery experienced destabilizing shifts in international capital flows due to terms of trade shocks before and after WWI. He argues that negative terms of trade shocks depressed export revenues, and that capital inflows shrank as investment became less attractive. Current and capital account shocks thus reinforced one another, provoking financial crisis and inhibiting growth. We attempt to quantify this response. We examine a formal model in which a secular improvement in the terms of trade leads to higher levels of investment, and hence long-run economic growth, while higher volatility in the terms of trade reduces investment, and hence growth, because of aversion to risk. We then test the predictions of the model using the only reliable source of investment data for the period in question-British capital flows to the periphery from 1870 to 1913. While we do not find evidence that secular changes in terms of trade influenced capital flows, volatility mattered. A one standard deviation increase in terms of trade volatility was associated with at least a 25 percent decrease in average capital flows to the Periphery. Our investment results are somewhat sensitive to specification, however, and so we conclude that while investment was clearly one channel of impact, volatility must have impacted growth along other channels as well.
Finally, we identify asymmetric effects between Core and Periphery. We observe higher average terms of trade growth and lower volatility in the Core. We also see that volatility was distinctly harmful to growth in the Periphery, but not so in the Core. It may be that rich countries with more sophisticated institutions and markets were better able to insure against price volatility than poor countries, so that terms of trade instability is likely to have had a far bigger negative impact in the Periphery than the Core. We also find asymmetry for the effects of secular terms of trade improvements. Since such positive price shocks should have reinforced comparative advantage, they should have induced more industrialization in the Core and less in the Periphery. If industrialization is the central carrier of growth, the terms of trade improvement should raise growth rates in the Core but lower them in the Periphery. This pattern is indeed the one we observe.
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some of the empirical and theoretical support for the relationship between the terms of trade and development, and makes the economics explicit. Section 3 presents the data. Our empirical strategy is described in Section 4, and the results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Theory and Evidence on the Terms of Trade and Development
In the introduction to his famous 1950 article, Hans Singer proposed that fluctuations in the terms of trade dramatically affected the funds available to poor countries for capital formation, and hence growth. Unfortunately for Singer, he missed an opportunity by failing to dwell on this point, and focused instead on the implications of a secular deterioration in the terms of trade.
The literature on the postulated secular deterioration is long and contentious. It is also, for the most part, immaterial, since from the longer backwards view in 2004 little trend appears to exist. In contrast, it was indeed possible to look back from 1950 and observe a downward drift in the commodity terms of trade. Along with Raoul Prebisch (1950) , Singer argued that the fundamental nature of these commodities made it inevitable that primary product prices would fall relative to manufactures in the long run, and so the terms of trade and incomes of commodity exporters would decline over time. The "Prebisch-Singer thesis" has not survived the half century since they wrote, since we now think that structural breaks, serially correlated residuals, and unit roots may explain the patterns we see. 6 Grilli and Yang (1988) analyze 20 th century commodity price data and find evidence of periodic structural breaks, but no trend. Bleaney and Greenaway (1993) contest this finding, and demonstrate the existence of a downward trend, but one of only -0.5 percent per annum. Such a trend, if it even exists, is very small relative to short term fluctuations, and so the remainder of this essay expects volatility to matter far more.
When thinking about fluctuations in the terms of trade, it will be useful to decompose annual disturbances in the terms of trade, or shocks, into the secular trend and the variance around this trend, which we call volatility. The literature has addressed the impact of all three types of terms of trade shocks on macroeconomic performance, although the distinction is seldom articulated.
Terms of Trade Shocks and Short Run Macroeconomic Performance
After several decades of debate, there is still no really well-articulated theory, let alone consensus, on the short run macroeconomic effects of terms of trade shocks.
One set of theories predicts a negative correlation between terms of trade improvements and growth, a relationship often referred to as the Resource Curse. Warner (1995, 2001) , for instance, have observed that resource-rich countries tend to grow more slowly than resource-poor
countries. Yet no single resource curse theory is universally accepted. Sachs and Warner prefer the "crowding-out" logic, whereby primary production crowds out manufacturing activities. A political economy approach offers an alternative, usually relying on some form of government ineptitude or corruption. Krueger (1974) famously argued that rent-seeking was a growth-suppressing tendency of resource-owning elites in poor countries. Tornell and Velasco (1992) suggested that resource-rich developing countries have undeveloped property rights, so that gains are transferred to rich countries for safekeeping and terms of trade booms translate into capital flight.
Another set of theories claims that terms of trade improvements raise the value of output and the returns to investment in developing countries, and hence predict a positive correlation between those improvements and growth. Kose and Riezman (2001) , for example, construct a stochastic, dynamic, two-sector model of a small open African economy. Terms of trade shocks have a direct effect on output since both sectors use imported goods as factors of production. In a numerical simulation of their model, trade shocks account for 45 percent of the variation in aggregate output and 86 percent of the variation in investment. Basu and McLeod (1992) develop a stochastic growth model in which imported inputs make production more efficient, but a drop in export prices make such inputs more costly and reduce output. They confirm that transitory terms of trade shocks have persistent effects on output levels in a sample of 12 primarily Latin American countries.
Empirical evidence from Africa seems to support the latter prediction rather than the resource curse one. Deaton and Miller (1996) employ vector autoregressions and find that a sudden 10 percent increase in commodity prices results in a 6 percent increase in output. Commodity price shocks account for much of the investment volatility in African economies as well. Deaton (1999) The analysis of such shocks is useful in illustrating the direct and immediate effects on GDP, but it does not identify the longer term impact on growth and development, and it fails to account explicitly for the difference between permanent and transitory changes in the terms of trade on growth. Accordingly, the literature has begun to investigate the role of short-range terms of trade trends on accumulation and long run growth.
Terms of Trade Trends and Long Run Macroeconomic Performance
The predicted relationship between terms of trade trends and economic development hinges on one's belief about the productivity of natural resource activities. Those who advocate the resource curse view argue that natural resource sectors are inherently unproductive, because, for example, they encourage rent-seeking behavior and fail to stimulate human capital accumulation. The alternative view typically ignores political economy considerations and assumes that natural resource activities generate the same externalities as do manufacturing activities. Mendoza (1997) , for example, takes this more benign view in which an increase in the price of the commodity export increases the expected rate of return on investment in that sector, thus augmenting accumulation and growth economy- 
Terms of Trade Volatility and Economic Growth
Most theories of terms of trade volatility also operate through the investment channel. 7 The development literature offers an abundance of microeconomic evidence linking income volatility to lower investment in both physical and human capital. Households imperfectly protected from risk change their income-generating activities in the face of income volatility, diversifying and skewing towards low-risk alternatives with lower returns. 8 Volatility can also result in suboptimal levels of investment in productive assets (Rosenweig and Wolpin 1993; Fafchamps 2004) . Finally, severe cuts in health and education seem to follow from negative shocks to income-cuts that disproportionately affect children and hence long term human capital accumulation in poor countries. For example, it has been shown that negative income shocks caused large numbers of households to withdraw their children from school in Cote d'Ivoire and India (Jensen 2000; Jacoby and Skoufias 1997) , while the recent In-7 Another smaller literature examines civil conflict as the channel through which terms of trade shocks affect long run growth. Rodrik (1999) offers one example. Miguel et al. (2004) , however, find no relationship between the terms of trade and conflict in Africa over the last two decades. We plan to explore this issue in future papers. 8 For a review, see Dercon (2004) and Fafchamps (2004) .
donesian financial crisis has been shown to have reduced enrollment and health expenditures (Frankenburg et al. 1999; Thomas et al. 2004 ).
Poor households cannot smooth their consumption and investments in the face of shocks because they are rationed in credit and insurance. So too on a macroeconomic scale-governments in the Periphery often find it difficult to borrow internationally, making it hard to smooth public investment and expenditure in the face of terms of trade shocks. 9 Ramey and Ramey (1995) Formally, households choose a consumption path that will maximize expected lifetime utility:
( )
where C t is consumption of the imported good, β is the subjective discount rate, and γ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Households maximize utility subject to the following period-by-period budget constraint:
9 While greater volatility increases the need for international borrowing to help smooth domestic consumption, Catão and Kapur (2004) have shown recently that volatility constrained the ability to borrow between 1970 and 2001.
where A t is the stock of wealth in units of an exportable commodity in period t, R t is the stochastic rate of return realized each period that yields units of the exportable commodity that agents exchange for units of the importable good, and z t is the relative terms of trade (or the price of exports in terms of imports in world markets). R t and z t are non-negative random variables such that the effective rate of return r t = R t z t+1 /z t follows a log-normal i.i.d. distribution. Hence ln(r t ) has mean µ and variance σ 2 .
Mendoza obtains closed form solutions for consumption and wealth, and demonstrates that consumption growth can be expressed as:
where (1-λ) is the saving rate with respect to wealth, and it is a function of the mean and variance of the terms of trade:
Since it is assumed that agents cannot insure against fluctuations in r t , an increase in the volatility of the terms of trade (i.e., a mean-preserving increase in σ 2 ) leads to reduced savings and increased consumption if the coefficient of relative risk aversion, γ, is lower than 2. Growth in the terms of trade (an increase in µ) has the opposite effect.
As Bleaney and Greenaway (2001) note, the strong predictions of the Mendoza model with respect to the impact of terms of trade trend on consumption growth do not necessarily carry over to output growth. Rather, the desired relationships between output growth and terms of trade trend and volatility demand that the coefficient of relative risk aversion γ be less than 1. Thus, the theory is ambiguous regarding the effects of trends and volatility of the terms of trade on growth and investment.
Even so, in samples over short time periods, the empirical evidence seems to support a negative impact of terms of trade volatility and a positive impact of terms of trade growth. 
Commodities and Prices
Prebisch and Singer contended that primary products are alike in that they all tend to decline in price relative to manufactures, but their claim has proven difficult to support. We examine the price behavior of 42 commodities on world markets, primarily from the reputable UK Statist-Sauerbeck commodity price index and supplemented from a number of other sources. If anything, the most important feature of commodity prices over our 70 years-and hence the terms of trade of commodityspecialized countries-is not their long-term drift, but rather their volatility. Volatility across products varies by more than a factor of ten. To illustrate, Figure 3 depicts trend growth and volatility in the prices of 9 primary products over the three twenty-year periods. Commodity prices experienced the highest average growth and lowest volatility from 1890 to 1909, and the highest volatility and slowest growth during the interwar years. Within each period, however, some primary products were very volatile (such as coffee or tobacco), while others were relatively stable (like wheat or iron). Note that volatility between commodities often differed by a factor of two or three, and in some cases by a factor of six or seven. What's more, while some commodity prices rose (such as tobacco or wool) others suffered sharp reversals (such as rubber, which was supplanted by cheaper synthetics in the interwar period). Since most countries specialized in a handful of commodities, such differences in price behavior translated into diverse country experience, or, as we noted above, what Diaz-Alejandro called the "commodity lottery" (Diaz-Alejandro 1984).
Countries and Country Data
We have collected new terms of data for 35 countries across six continents. We divide our sample into Core and Periphery nations, an allocation based on traditions in the historical development literature which relies on geography, endowments, economic structure, commodity dependence, and the level of development. Table 1 lists the countries, their GDP per capita, the share of their exports in primary products, their export concentration, and their export share in GDP. Our Periphery was mostly poor, commodity-specialized, and highly concentrated in one or two export products. There are fourteen countries in our Core, including four Industrial Leaders (France, Germany, the UK, and the USA), five European Industrial Latecomers (Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Italy, Norway, and Sweden),
and five in what we call the European Periphery (Greece, Portugal, Serbia, Spain, and Russia). The
Periphery numbers twenty-one, including eight in Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Cuba, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay), ten in Asia and the Middle East (Burma, Ceylon, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, Siam, and Turkey), and three rich European Offshoots (Australia, Canada, and New Zealand). Any division between Core and Periphery is of course somewhat arbitrary, but our results are generally robust to the allocation, in particular the relocation of the European Periphery or the European Offshoots.
GDP per Capita and Capital Flows
For most countries in our sample, the primary source of GDP per capita estimates (in 1990 $US) is Maddison (1995) . Since his developing country GDP estimates often begin only with 1900 or even 1913, estimates for earlier years must be obtained from supplementary sources, in particular backcasting from the Maddison 1900 or 1913 benchmarks by using estimates of real wage or output growth constructed by Jeffrey Williamson. Full details are available in the data Appendix. The doubtful quality of the GDP per capita growth estimates for some countries, and especially for the late 19 th century, implies that measured changes in GDP per capita over a decade or more are almost certainly more reliable than annual estimates. They will also give a better fix on long run effects. 11 As long as the measurement errors are random, they should not, of course, bias our econometric estimates, but rather only raise standard errors.
Our international capital flow data are measured with far more precision. They refer to British capital exports for the period 1870 to World War I, and our country sample received 92 percent of it.
We choose British capital exports as a measure of international capital flows for two reasons. First, it is available. 12 Second, Britain was then the world's leading capital exporter, far exceeding the combined capital exports of its nearest competitors, France and Germany. Thus British capital was the dominant source of international capital for more than forty years. Clemens and Williamson (2004) document that this capital flowed to where it was more profitable-chasing natural resources, educated populations, migrants and young populations. We will explore the impact of exogenous terms of trade shocks on such flows.
The Country Terms of Trade
The net barter terms of trade is, of course, defined as the ratio of export to import prices. The US and six of our European countries have excellent terms of trade data, but this is not true of the rest.
Thus, we constructed new terms of trade series for the remaining twenty-eight. 13 Formally, for product i, country j, and period t. Note that we employ an international market price for both numerator and denominator, prices which have the advantage of greater accuracy and availability.
14 More importantly, in the small country case (a definition that seems to capture our Periphery export- 12 The data were originally collected by Leland Jenks and Matthew Simon, and then reported by Stone (1999) . They were cleaned recently by Clemens and Williamson (2004) . 13 Given the extensive previous effort that has gone into the construction of existing US and the six European terms of trade series, we have opted to employ these terms of trade indices. These traditional indices have not necessarily been constructed using the same price sources and weighting schemes, and so are not strictly comparable to our indices constructed for the periphery. But since the primary object of our investigation is the Periphery, and the Core is considered for comparative proposes only, we do not think differences in terms of trade construction pose a serious problem. Moreover, construction techniques seem similar and hence fairly comparable. 14 To the extent that transport costs and tariff rates change significantly over time, a country's terms of trade measured in home markets might have obeyed somewhat different laws of motion than ours having been measured in international markets. While our indices might not exactly represent domestic prices, we are confident that the two sources would yield very
, ers) changes in the world price of the commodity can be treated as exogenous shocks. Also note that the import index in the denominator is in fact a price index for extensively traded US manufactured goods. 15 The same import price index has been used for all periphery countries since reliable countryspecific import mix data are not available for most periphery countries before World War I. 16 Focusing our analysis on the purchasing power of a country's exports in terms of a common basket of manufactured products is actually advantageous in that we can isolate the between-country effect of relative commodity price movements on growth. appears. Second, as we noted above, downward drift is not itself evidence of a trend. Time series tests fail to find evidence of a common deterministic trend. We cannot reject the presence of a unit root in two-thirds of the countries and, in countries where trends appear, they are generally small and certainly not universal to all primary product producers.
Trend and Volatility in the New Terms of Trade Series
In short, our country terms of trade exhibit considerable year-to-year fluctuations, as well short term trend movements or cycles, but little long-term trend-bolstering our prior conjecture that terms similar trends, especially after 1900 when the decline in ocean transport costs slowed down considerably (Shah Mohammed and Williamson 2004) . 15 The index is a weighted sum of the prices of textiles (55%), metals (15%), machinery (15%), building materials (7.5%), and chemicals and pharmaceuticals (7.5%) from the US Department of Commerce Historical Statistics. US data are employed because continuous price indices for comparable goods are unavailable for any other country. We draw comfort from the fact that the US price index tracks very closely the British Board of Trade index of export prices, and terms of trade series constructed from the UK and US price indices have a correlation coefficient of 0.91.
of trade volatility mattered far more in the historical past than did long run trend. This conjecture accords well with Mendoza's model, as outlined in the previous section. Growth of the trend in the terms of trade and decreases in the variance around trend (i.e., volatility) each raise economic growth.
There are several options for decomposing terms of trade movements into trend and volatility.
Mendoza employs the terms of trade growth rate and the standard deviation of the growth rate. There are three potential drawbacks to this approach. First, the growth rate of the terms of trade over a period of time (such as a decade) will be overstated if there is a positive shock in the tenth year, and understated if there is a negative shock. More volatile countries will thus be measured with less accuracy, leading to systematic measurement error. Second, a structural break or a discrete change in the rate of growth will register as both a change in trend and a change in volatility, potentially confusing the effects. Third, persistent shocks away from trend will result in a lower measure of volatility than a shock that returns to trend the following year. Shocks that persist for more than a year before returning to trend will register as volatility, since they remain deviations from measured trend. The standard deviation of the growth rate of the terms of trade, on the other hand, will instead register only the initial shock and its eventual return to trend as volatility. The more gradual and consistent the return to trend, the lower the volatility measure, and so shocks that die out slowly will register as less volatile, even though the distortion may be greater.
We would prefer measures of trend and volatility that do not relate in a systematic way to one another and that minimize the measurement error in the trend. A practical solution is to use a filter that produces a smooth trend and stationary deviations. The Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter is a common choice, used by Basu and McLeod (1992) among others, 17 and we employ it here. 18 Over the 10-year 16 What data do exist, however, suggest that the assumption closely approximates reality. Moreover, Kose and Riezman (2001) suggest that the use of such a price index is superior to an import index when examining the effects of trade shocks, and that such an index exhibits similar levels of volatility compared with a pure terms of trade measure. 17 Similar methodologies have been used by other authors to measure the variability in the terms of trade. Lutz (1994) for example removes a linear trend (in the log of the terms of trade) and uses the variance of the residuals as a measure of volatility. This strategy has the problem of generating large residuals and therefore large implied volatility when there are changes in slope or structural breaks. Turnovsky and Chattopadhyay (2003) measure volatility as the variance of residuals from estimating a first-order autoregressive process for the terms of trade. The results from this procedure may be sensitive to the exact specification used and it seems unlikely to us that the terms of trade series for different countries in our sample are intervals used in our analysis, the HP data filter and Mendoza's method generate very similar results.
The correlations of growth rates and volatility produced by the two methods are .85 and .86 respectively, and our findings are robust to both.
Empirical Strategy
Our identifying assumption is that terms of trade shocks are exogenous. The Periphery countries in our sample are generally too small and their primary product export share in world supply is too little to affect world price. Moreover, we would expect violations of this assumption (e.g. Chile and copper) to cause our results to understate the predicted positive impact of the terms of trade on growth. For instance, if a negative shock to the supply of copper in Chile caused the world market price to rise just as copper output (and hence GDP) in Chile fell, there would be a negative correlation between the terms of trade trend and output growth, biasing the coefficient on trend growth downwards.
Following Mendoza (1997) , we employ a very parsimonious empirical model, regressing average GDP per capita growth rates on average trend growth and volatility in the terms of trade alone. 19 We do the same for our capital flow equations, regressing the level of capital flows on terms of trade growth and volatility. The assumed exogeneity of the terms of trade implies that adding additional control variables should not change the estimated impact of the terms of trade. We find this to be the case, and will see that the addition of conventional determinants of growth as controls (population, schooling, openness, and so forth) do not alter our results. However, we might expect that the effect of exogenous terms of trade shocks on output is an increasing function of the importance of trade to the economy, and so we test this proposition by interacting the growth rate of the terms of trade with the initial share of exports in GDP for each country.
equally well described by a single autoregressive process. In any event, there is a high correlation (.87) between our measure of volatility and an alternative measure calculated using Turnovsky and Chattopadhyay's methodology. 18 We set the smoothing parameter in the HP filter at 300, which implies a relatively slow-changing trend. A more quickly changing trend (such as that achieved with a smoothing parameter of 100 or lower) does not materially affect our results. 19 As noted above, Mendoza actually employed per capita consumption growth as a proxy for output growth. We do not have data on consumption, and so follow other authors in analyzing the effects on per capita GDP growth.
The unit of observation is a decade, and thus the dependent variable is the average annual growth of GDP per capita over some decade. Similarly, our terms of trade growth measure is the percentage change in the trend in the terms of trend (calculated from the HP filter) over the decade, while volatility is measured by the standard deviation of departures from this trend. 20 All of our specifications include country and decade fixed effects in order to control for unobserved fundamentals that were also determining growth performance, fundamentals that are not the focus on this paper. Finally, all standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.
Results

Terms of Trade and Growth of per Capita Income
The impact of secular change and volatility in the terms of trade (henceforth TOT) are presented in report results with and without a term interacting TOT Trend Growth with export share of GDP to see whether the terms of trade impact was contingent upon the level of openness and export dependence. It seems reasonable that more export-oriented countries would respond more forcefully to external shocks. Export shares are taken from the first year of the decade to avoid problems of endogeneity.
The top half of Table 2 reports the regression estimates and hypothesis testing for the terms of trade effects. The bottom half of the table reports the quantitative and economic importance of these terms of trade effects. Thus, the bottom half of Table 2 reports the sample means and standard deviations of the independent variables, as well as their marginal impact. The latter is measured as the pre- 20 We have experimented with alternative ways of measuring terms of trade growth and volatility. These results are in the appendix. 21 The Periphery consists of 21 countries and we have data for every country and every decade, except for one countrydecade observation, giving us a sample of 125 (=21*6-1). There are a few more missing observations from the interwar Core, leaving us with 79 observations instead of 84 (=14*6) that would be available in a complete dataset.
dicted change in output growth from a marginal increase in the independent variable. For terms of trade volatility, the marginal impact is just the coefficient estimate. Marginal impact is defined the same way for trend growth when there is no interaction term. When we introduce the interaction term, marginal impact is the sum of the coefficient estimates on TOT Trend Growth by itself and the interaction term, the latter multiplied by the mean of export share. Finally, the last rows of Table 2 show the predicted change in output from a one-standard-deviation increase in either the growth or volatility of the terms of trade, thus showing how a plausible change in independent variables would have influenced output.
To begin with, columns (1) and (2) strongly support the asymmetry hypothesis. Changes in secular trends in the terms of trade were significantly and positively associated with output growth in the Core, but not in the Periphery. Changes in volatility had a significant negative influence on income growth in the Periphery, but not in the Core. This asymmetry between industrial-exporting Core and primary-product-exporting Periphery continues to hold when we introduce an interaction term between TOT Trend Growth and export share in columns (3) and (4). The net effect of trend growth will be sorted out below in the marginal impact calculations, but it is interesting to note the signs. The negative sign on the linear term for the Periphery implies that terms of trade improvements in developing countries reduced output growth in that decade. However, the positive sign on the interaction term suggests that the negative effect was mitigated, perhaps entirely undone, by having a more open economy exporting a larger share of output. 22 An increase in export share, holding constant concentration, may have acted as a foil to rent-seekers, or exerted a positive influence on output growth through various channels, such as efficiency gains or the development of better institutions. We also observe that including the interaction term improves the statistical significance on volatility.
When we restrict our attention to the period before World War I in columns (5) through (8), our main findings continue to receive strong support. Improvements in long-run trends in the terms of 22 Note that we are holding fixed volatility in the terms of trade so we have in effect controlled for export concentration.
trade affected output growth positively in the Core, but not in the Periphery, while volatility diminished growth in the Periphery, but not in the Core. When we restrict our attention to the interwar period in columns (9) through (12), we are left with a much smaller sample (23 observations in the Core and 41 in the Periphery). As a result, standard errors are large and statistical significance low, but we note that the point estimates are generally consistent with those found for the pre-war period. It seems reasonable, therefore, to conclude that the same forces were at work both before and after the war.
The economic effects of our estimates are big. A one-standard-deviation increase in TOT Trend
Growth was associated with a 0.45 percentage point increase in the average annual growth rate of per capita GDP --a big number given that the average annual growth rate in the Core was just 1.4 percent. Combined, these two eminently plausible counterfactuals -the proposed changes are less than one half of one standard deviation away from the means, would have eliminated nearly the entire gap in growth rates between Core and Periphery.
What were the channels of terms of trade impact? Here we investigate one possibility, capital accumulation financed by capital inflows, leaving further research on this question for future work. We have already noted that Britain was the paramount source of development capital during these years.
We find that gross capital flows from Britain to Periphery countries were decreasing in TOT volatility ( Figure 5 ). In Table 3 , the dependent variable is log of the average capital inflows a country received from Britain over 10-year periods between 1870 and 1909. The specification in Table 3 is the same as that used for output in Table 2 , and asymmetry is confirmed once more. Neither long-run changes nor volatility in the terms of trade seems to have been important in attracting British capital to other countries in the Core. In the Periphery, however, greater volatility reduced capital inflows from Britain.
Whether the interaction term is present or absent, terms of trade volatility enters negatively and significantly in the Periphery equations at the ninety percent level, but it is not significant in the Core regressions. These results are significant at the 95 percent level when the European Periphery is included (see below), or when the identical regression is run on 5-year intervals rather than 10-year ones (results not shown), increasing our confidence in investment flows as a channel of impact. It is worth noting that when we attempt to normalize capital inflows by examining capital flows per capita or as a share of GDP, we confirm the negative relationship between volatility and foreign investment, but the results are not statistically significant (results not shown).
What about the economic significance of these estimates? Column (2) suggests that a one-standard deviation increase in volatility reduced capital inflows by 0.25 log points or 25 percent. In the absence of data on capital stocks, we cannot estimate whether the terms of trade impact on foreign capital flows translated into a big or small domestic capital accumulation response. Our guess, however, is that domestic savings were even more powerfully influenced by terms of trade shocks than were foreign capital flows.
Robustness Checks
We have checked and confirmed the robustness of our results with respect to the following: alternative methods of decomposing terms of trade series into trend and fluctuations, alternative CorePeriphery definitions, and alternative specifications including additional controls. These results are presented in Appendix tables.
First, in Table A1 , we reproduce Table 2 using Mendoza's definitions of terms of trade growth and volatility-the growth rate of TOT and the standard deviation of the growth rate of TOT. The findings are remarkably similar-higher TOT growth and lower TOT volatility are both associated with improved economic growth. The results on volatility are only significant over the pre-WWI period, however, although the marginal and one-standard-deviation impact estimates of volatility on growth are almost identical to the estimates using the HP-filtered deviations. The estimated impact of TOT growth is much greater than that from our HP-filtered trend. As we noted above, Mendoza's decomposition confounds trend with volatility somewhat, and it seems reasonable to presume that this confounding drives the strength of the TOT growth impact observed in Table A1 . 23 Second, in Table A2 we check to make sure that our results are robust to the use of alternatives to the HP filter with a smoothing parameter of 300 (a slow-moving trend). These include HP filter with a smoothing parameter of 100 (a relatively fast-moving trend) and an MA filter with a 7-year window.
Volatility in both cases is measured as standard deviations of departures from trend. Our point esti- 23 Consider that, in the event of a single-year positive terms of trade shock in the last year of the decade, the TOT growth rate by Mendoza would rise, but that using the HP-filter would not. To the extent that there is an immediate and direct increase in measured GDP in the year of the shock (because of the price effect), Mendoza's measure will be positively correlated with growth. To the extent that such shocks have little or no effect on long-term GDP growth, we should observe little correlation between it and the HP filter measure of TOT growth.
mates are nearly identical, and while statistical significance suffers using the MA filter, the alternative HP filter is highly significant.
Third, since any choice of the Periphery is necessarily arbitrary, Tables A3 and A4 re-estimate   Table 2 using alternative definitions of the Periphery. We see that whether the European Periphery or the European Offshoots are excluded from the Periphery sample, our central findings stand. Our point estimates actually strengthen our case in most instances.
Fourth, we check the robustness of the capital flow results. Tables A5 and A6 repeat the above robustness checks for the capital inflows regressions. In Table A5 , we see that our point estimates are similar using HP filters with slow-and fast-moving trends, as well as using Mendoza's measure of volatility (although the results for the latter are not statistically significant). In Table A6 , we see that the capital flows results are not robust to exclusion of the European Offshoots, probably in part because of the loss of observations, but also because the offshoots had both low volatility and were major destinations for British capital, and are hence influential observations. It is worth noting however that inclusion of the European Periphery in our definition of the Periphery increases both our point estimates and the statistical significance of the relationship.
Finally, while we do not show results from specifications which include additional controls, our results are robust to the addition of school enrollment rates, tariff rates, share of primary products in exports, population growth and lagged GDP. 24 If the terms of trade shocks are indeed exogenous, then we would not expect the inclusion of such controls to affect our point estimates of TOT growth and volatility. This is indeed the case, corroborating our identifying assumption.
Conclusions
We have reconstructed nearly a century of terms of trade experience from 1870 to 1939 and assessed its impact on the economic performance of the industrial Core and the primary-product producing Periphery. As a result of a heavily concentrated export mix in most of the Periphery, secular trend 24 These results are available on request.
and volatility in the terms of trade varied spectacularly across countries, both depending on commodity specialization. Our analysis suggests that those terms of trade movements were an important determinant of country-specific growth performance. They were especially important in the Periphery where volatility in the terms of trade was particularly damaging to economic growth. The analysis suggests that had volatility been reduced by one standard deviation in the Periphery, it would have raised per capita income growth there by 0.5 percentage points per annum, erasing most of growth gap between Core and Periphery. These results are surprisingly robust to the use of alternative Periphery allocations, terms of trade growth and volatility measures, and time period.
What is especially notable about our results is the persistent identification of striking asymmetry between Core and Periphery. Where terms of trade volatility was present, it created a significant drag on output growth in the Periphery. This was not true of the Core-where it experienced the same high price volatility, it did not experience the same drag on growth. In addition, while the Core benefited greatly from a small but positive long-run terms of trade trend, positive trends-when they did appear-did not translate in to more growth in the Periphery, but rather less. Moreover, when we investigate one channel of terms of trade impact-the flow of investment funds from Britain-we find evidence that capital inflows were negatively influenced by terms of trade volatility in the Periphery, but not in the Core. While our capital flows results are not nearly as robust as our growth results, they still point to an important channel of impact. Other channels are likely to be of importance, however, such as the effect of terms of trade shocks on the incidence of civil conflict (Rodrik 1999) . These alternative channels await further investigation.
The patterns we observe here raise a number of additional questions. Exactly what kind of insurance did the more industrial Core countries take out that allowed them to escape the damaging consequences of terms of trade instability, insurance that was not, apparently, available to primary product exporters in the Periphery? Did the industrial Core simply have better-developed mechanisms by which to insure against adverse shocks? Why was it that countries in the Periphery did not benefit when the terms of trade rose over the long-term, or suffer when they fell? Does this evidence support de-industrialization and resource curse effects? Finally, while we have taken each country's terms of trade to be exogenous, future work might be advised to explore the deeper question: What were the sources of the cross-product differences in terms of trade trends and volatility, and why did some primary products (and hence countries) experience great volatility in their terms of trade while others enjoyed more stability?
These questions will have to await future research, but we hope that it will dwell on country impact, the direction taken here. Asia & Oceania, 1750 (New York: Stockton Press, 1998 . hereafter Mitchell. Maddison (1995) , GDP per capita is calculated by dividing a country's income (in 1990 US dollars) by population in every year. Sources of the population data have been described elsewhere in this appendix, and the sources of the income estimates follow.
GDP and GDP per capita
Data for Argentina after 1890 come from Maddison op. cit. Before this date, GDP per capita is assumed to grow at the same year-on-year rate as the estimates of Argentine real wages found in Jeffrey G. Williamson, 1995 Mitchell (1993) . These NNP values are converted to 1990 US dollars with the help of the peso-dollar exchange rate given in Taylor (2000) Data for Peru after 1900 come from Maddison op. cit. Before this date it is assumed that Peru grew at the same year-on-year rate as did our estimates of Argentine GDP per capita.
Data for the Philippines after 1900 come from Maddison op. cit. Before this date it is assumed that Philippine GDP per capita grew at the same year-on-year rate as our estimates for Siam.
Estimates for Serbia after 1890 come from Foreman-Peck and Lains, op. cit. Before 1890 GDP per capita is assumed to grow at the same year-on-year rate as it did between 1890 and 1913.
Estimates for Turkey after 1913 come from Maddison. Before this date it is assumed that GDP per capita grew at the same year-on-year rate as did estimates of Turkish real wages from Jeffrey Williamson, 2000, "Real wages and relative factor prices around the Mediterranean, 1500-1940," in Şevket Pamuk and Jeffrey G. Williamson, eds. The Mediterranean Response to Globalization Before 1950, Routledge, New York.
Data for Uruguay after 1882 comes from Maddison op. cit. Before this date it is assumed that Uruguay grew at the same year-on-year rate as did our estimates of Argentine GDP per capita. GDP for Uruguay is taken from Mitchell (1993) for the period 1935-1940. Annual GDP per capita estimates 1914-1934 are calculated by assuming that Uruguay deviated from her GDP per capita trend (between the benchmark years of 1914, found in Clemens and Williamson (2000) , and 1935, found in Mitchell) in the same way that Argentina did.
Data for a small remaining number of missing years are geometrically interpolated.
Terms of Trade Index (or the Net Barter Terms of Trade -NBTT)
Existing data series were employed for the terms of trade for the US, the UK, France, Germany, Sweden, Italy and Austria. Table B4 , p. 262.
For the remaining countries, a NBTT series was calculated from original sources. Note that the NBTT is simply the ratio of export prices to import prices, each weighted appropriately. Mathematically,
for product i, country j, and period t. Note that in this formulation the numerator, the export price index, is country-specific while the denominator, the import price index, is not. This is a simplification employed in this paper due to (i) the limited quality and quantity of data on imports and import prices to countries in the periphery, and (ii) the similarity observed, in what records are available, between the composition of imports to developing countries. While detailed data on exports weights and prices are available for virtually all of the countries and all of the years in our sample, import data are much more limited. These limitations and their consequences are discussed below.
Export Weights. For the purposes of this study, export weights have been calculated by individual country using the current value of major commodity exports and fixed weights. The use of a fixed set of weights is essential for disentangling price from quantity movements. Of course, any such approach is fundamentally flawed, not least because over a long period of time the mix of major commodity exports can shift significantly. A compromise position was taken by changing the export weights at approximately 20-year sub-periods. These subperiods are 1870-1890, 1890-1913, 1913-1929, and 1930-1950 , and within these the weights are calculated using sample year data. Export values for major commodities for Canada, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, Paraguay, and Peru are taken from Mitchell, International Historical Statistics The Americas 1750 ff. Table E3 . The same data for Australia, Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Japan, Philippines, Siam, Turkey and New Zealand come from Mitchell, International Historical Statistics Africa, Asia and Oceania 1750-1993, p.637 ff. Commodities in 1916 , Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, vol. 80/2 p. 289 ff. for the years 1908 -1916 . Sauerbeck, Wholesale Prices in 1950 , Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, vol. 114/3 1951 Persia, 1850 Persia, -1906 Import Weights. A single set of import weights is employed for all countries in the sample. Import data, unlike that of exports, is almost uniformly poor, in particular in countries outside the European Core. Traditionally, studies of country terms of trade have compensated for this lack of data through the use of British export data as a proxy for the imports of less developed nations. This approach is undesirable given that the composition of British exports can hardly be considered representative of the imports of developing countries as a whole, and because the use of current-year weights means that movements reflect changes in composition, not just prices. As an alternative, however, we employ a fixed index of non-primary goods from US statistics. This import index, like the British one, is country invariant. In the end, the differences are not material; the two series are almost identical (probably due to the heavy content of metals and textiles in both indices). This US manufactured export statistic is a weighted sum of the prices of textiles (55%), metals (15%), machinery (15%), building materials (7.5%), and chemicals and pharmaceuticals (7.5%). Obviously a fixed weighting for all developing nations is unrepresentative of their particular import mix (but while not representative of the specific import mix of the country, such a metric may be relevant for measuring the changing value of the country's exports versus a fixed package of manufactured products available for import. In this sense our terms of trade represent the purchasing power of local commodities in terms of rich-country goods.) Moreover, a review of each nation's external commerce documents turns up remarkably similar import compositions. For the years 1870-1900, import composition for Australia, Canada, Ceylon, India and New Zealand was examined from Statistical abstract for the several colonies and other possessions of the United Kingdom no. -governing dominions, colonies, possessions, and protectorates no.41-53, 1903-1915 , Statistical abstract for the several British oversea dominions and protectorates no. 54-59, 1917 -1927 , Statistical abstract for the British Empire no.60-68, 1929 -1938 , Statistical abstract for the British Commonwealth no.69-70, 1945 -1947 and Statistical abstract for the Commonwealth (trade statistics) no.71-72, 1948 Commonwealth (trade statistics) no.71-72, -1951 . Composition of main imports for reference years after 1900 for Argentina, Chile, Greece, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Serbia, Spain, Siam, Uruguay comes from Die Wirtschaft des Auslandes 1900 -1927 , Berlin 1928 An Additional Note on Import and Export Price Data. UK and US prices are employed in the theory that the prices in these large, integrated and (in the UK, at least) unprotected markets would supply us with a relatively reliable "world" price index for each commodity group. A chief disadvantage of using such world price indices, however, is that home market prices in each country may diverge from the world ones in the short and even long term. This may be because of differences in product features and quality, because of variations in the composition of the products within a category, or because of less-than-perfect market integration combined with local market conditions and shocks. Kindleberger (1958) illustrates the wide divergence in the prices of bulky products such as coal and lumber between two markets as closely integrated as the US and UK. Another disadvantage of not using the home market price is the distortion created by changes in transport costs. One would prefer a terms of trade measure that is independent of transport costs. In a moment we will discuss the adjustments made to our terms of trade figures to account for transport cost changes. Such adjustments as we can make, however, cannot truly represent actual freight-adjusted prices. Overall, though, we feel the advan-tages of employing world price indices outweigh these disadvantages. First and foremost, home market prices are not typically on hand for the periods and countries in question. Rather, only the somewhat less desirable unit prices (calculated as the value of imports divided by the volume) are available. Second and more important, we believe UK and US market prices to be more reliable, accurate and comparable given the quality of reporting (at the time) and the quality of scholarship on these prices since then. Third, to the extent that commodity markets are well integrated worldwide, the UK and US market prices should approximate the world price. This is especially true because we are interested in price changes, not levels. To the extent that UK and US prices move in similar directions and similar magnitudes to prices in the rest of the world, these "world" price indices will more or less represent price changes relative to an index year in other nations. We believe this to be a reasonable and necessary assumption. Fourth, these foreign market price indices would have been available to (and probably used) by industrialists and policymakers throughout the period in question. Accordingly, for questions of policy response (and perhaps price setting) foreign market indices may be a more appropriate data source than home market ones. Fifth, the use of a world price index harmonizes and simplifies construction of the indices, enabling us to examine a wider sample of countries at the cost, perhaps, of precision. Fifth, by measuring both the export and import price indices in a common currency, we eliminate any inflationary bias from the figures. 
